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An econometric model is estimated to identify determinants of trade imbalance in
international message telephone services markets. Results indicate that asymmetric
market structure is important in explaining bilateral market imbalances for high
income country pairs. For low and high income country pairs, GDP per capita is
the dominant cause of tra c imbalances. The ® ndings suggest that telecommunica-
tions liberalization policies are e ective in reducing distortions in international tra c
¯ ows and settlement payments. However, liberalization should be accompanied by
developmental programmes that enhance income per capita and telecommunications
network investment in developing countries. Such programmes may be e ective in
providing a more equitable distribution of the gains from telecommunications
reform across countries.
I . INTR OD UCTION
Telecommunications tra c is an important production
input for information intensive sectors, and its economic-
ally e cient delivery provides a basis for competitive
advantage. Between 1986 and 1995 world international
message telephone services (IMTS) tra c increased by
12.9 per cent per annum, with total retail revenues of 53
billion United States Dollars (US$) in 1995 (International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) 1997a) . Such services
are traditionally jointly provided by publicly-owned
monopolies who connect their local networks to designated
international gateways. Bilateral market cost sharing
agreements between countries are arranged through the
international accounting rate system. The accounting rate
is the basic `unit of account’ from which international set-
tlement payments are calculated. A carrier’ s accounting
rate share, the settlement rate, determines the amount the
carrier must pay to access another country’s network.
When settlement rates are equal for outgoing and incoming
calls, and outgoing is greater (less) than incoming tra c,
the home country is a net importer (exporter) of telephone
tra c and makes (receives) a settlement payment to (from)
the foreign country. In 1995, the amount paid by carriers
to settle IMTS tra c imbalances was USD28 billion (ITU,
1997a).
In the immediate post-war period the accounting rate
system provided a reasonable basis for international tele-
communications pricing and carrier settlements. Bilateral
tra c ¯ ows were generally balanced and retail prices (col-
lection rates) uniform. This stable environment began to
change in the 1980s with the erosion of natural monopoly
through rapid technological change, and the realization
that competition and private ownership are more likely
to increase e ciency and provide lower prices (Oum and
Zhang, 1995; Snow, 1995; Madden and Savage, 1997;
Spiller and Cardilli, 1997; Waverman and Sirel, 1997) .
The 1984 AT&T divestiture and privatization of British
Telecom led the movement away from the traditional
model of monopoly supply by stated-owned carriers. By
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1996, 13 countries had permitted facilities-based competi-
tion in the provision of IMTS, and 44 publicly owned car-
riers had been privatized, raising US$159 billion (ITU,
1997a). 1
Whilst technological advance has reduced the costs of
providing international services, the full extent of the cost
reductions are generally not re¯ ected in lower collection
rates. Ergas and Patterson (1991), Alleman and Sorce
(1998) and Frieden (1997) argued that the accounting
rate system, and asymmetric market structures on bilateral
markets, impose little discipline on monopoly carriers to
pass on cost reductions.2 Accordingly, collection rates have
diverged between low price countries that pursue liberal-
ization policies, and those which have not. Collection rate
reductions by low price countries such as the United States
(US) have increased their outgoing tra c relative to incom-
ing tra c, and provided high price countries with increased
settlement payments. This has occurred as users in low
price countries respond to declining collection rates, and
indirectly, as a result of substitution between the higher
price incoming tra c and lower price outgoing tra c
(Larson et al., 1990; Ergas and Patterson, 1991;
Sandback, 1996) .3
Increased outgoing tra c not only worsens the de® cit
nation’s trade balance through increased settlement pay-
ments but potentially transfer rents to monopoly countries.
These rents are the di erence between the settlement rate
(the originating carrier’s payment to access the foreign
country’s local exchange network) and the actual cost
incurred by the foreign carrier in terminating the call.
Nations with liberalized telecommunications markets that
have experienced de® cits in 1995 are Australia, Japan,
Sweden and the US. The largest de® cit has occurred in
the US. Between 1982 and 1995, settlement payments
from US to foreign carriers increased 16 per cent per
annum. The 1995 net settlement payment of US$4.94 bil-
lion accounted for 4.75% of the total US trade de® cit in
goods and services (International Monetary Fund (IMF),
1996 ; Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
1997a) . Both the FCC (1996, 1997b) and World Trade
Organisation (WTO, 1997) have called for the opening of
telecommunications markets to private and foreign inves-
tors, and increased competition in the delivery of local,
long-distance and international services. Such policies are
intended to promote price competition and productive e -
ciency. Collection and settlement rates that better re¯ ect
service provision costs reduce the rents within international
telecommunications pricing and so alleviate distortions in
tra c ¯ ows (and settlement payments) .
Several studies argue that competition and collection
rate di erentials alone do not explain tra c imbalances.
First, Cheong and Mullins (1991) showed that collection
rate di erentials were not strongly correlated with US traf-
® c de® cits and argued that Australia, whilst having no
facilities-based competition in 1991, had an imbalance pro-
portionately equivalent to the US. ITU (1996) data show
that Finland, New Zealand and the Philippines had tra c
surpluses in 1995 (despite facilities-based competition),
whilst the monopoly countries Cyprus, Qatar,
Luxembourg and Switzerland incurred tra c de® cits
(ITU, 1996; TeleGeography Inc., 1997) . Second, Cheong
and Mullins and the ITU (1994) argued economic develop-
ment, as measured by income per capita, is also important
in stimulating outgoing tra c and so a ects IMTS trade
imbalances. This ® nding suggests that policies which pro-
mote both economic and telecommunications network
development may provide a more e ective and equitable
means of stimulating tra c from low income countries to
high income countries.4 These remarks are anticipated by
Dr Gautam Kaji (1996, p. 5), Managing Director of the
World Bank:
The World Bank Group think the gains from telecom-
munications reform are big, and that the reforms are
inevitable. But what is not inevitable is the way in
which the reforms happen, and this will a ect the distri-
bution of the gains across countries. This of course, goes
to the heart of the concerns of those who fear that the
outcome of these negotiations will be to enable the rich
countries to exploit the poor countries.
This study empirically identi® es the determinants of IMTS
trade imbalances. An econometric model is estimated using
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1 Facilities-based carriers have their own transmission capacity.
2 Asymmetric market structure evolves from asymmetric regulation, that is, carriers in the domestic and foreign ends are subject to
di erent regulatory environments (Schankerman, 1996) . This study de® nes regulatory restraint in terms of competition (measured by the
number of carriers) and type of ownership, at both the domestic and foreign end of a bilateral market. For example, asymmetric market
structure may arise because there is a monopoly carrier at the domestic end of the bilateral market, and several carriers at the foreign end.
Alternatively, asymmetric market structure can be used to describe markets where the domestic carrier is publicly owned, whilst the
foreign carrier(s) is open to private ownership.
3 Substitution occurs through callback operators supplying a US dial tone to conumers wishing to place a call to the US, calling parties in
high price countries making a short call requesting to be called back, and reverse charge calling card services.
4 Settlement rate revenue may be used to upgrade developing country networks. However, the distribution of revenues follows no explicit
principle of equity or need. For example, in 1995 several OECD countries, including Canada, Japan, and South Korea, received net-
settlement payments in excess of US$100 million. By contrast, sub-Saharan Africa as a whole received just US$125 million, or 2% of
total settlement payments (ITU, 1997a) . Targeted assistance programmes may be more e ective in enhancing infrastructure investment
and stimulating usage in these countries.
annual data for 82 countries for the period 1991 through
1995. Model estimates isolate the e ect of collection rates,
market structure, and national income on tra c de® cits.
Low income country tra c ¯ ows are analysed separately
by estimating the model for a subsample of low and high
income country partners. Such analysis suggests reforms
to market structure should be complemented by policies
of economic development in low income countries.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD; 1995) and World Bank programmes that enhance
income per capita and facilitate telecommunications infra-
structure investment will ultimately lead to increased out-
going tra c from low income countries (see Kaji, 1996 ;
Wellenius and Stern, 1996) . The paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section II reviews the telecommunications literature
on the determinants of tra c de® cits. An econometric
model, and the data used for estimation, are described in
Section III. Estimation results are reported in Section IV.
Section V contains concluding remarks.
II . INTER N A TIONA L TELEPHONE
TR A FFIC DEFICITS
Empirical and econometric studies of international tele-
phone tra c ¯ ows are typically based on telephone
demand functions, and concerned with quantifying the
relationship between tra c and collection rates, and tra c
and income. A general indication of the relationships
between collection rates and IMTS imbalance, and
national income and IMTS imbalance, are found in Figs
1 and 2. Both ® gures suggest that imbalances are inversely
related to di erences in collection rates, and positively
related to di erences in national income.
Ergas and Patterson (1991) observed a large and growing
imbalance between US outgoing and incoming telephone
tra c. They found, for the period 1985 to 1988, that col-
lection rates for the US were generally lower than those of
their foreign counterparts. Ergas and Patterson argued that
increased competition among US carriers led to collection
rate reductions which stimulated US outgoing tra c.
Favourable tra c imbalances and sticky collection rates
are especially noticeable in developing countries. The
FCC (1992) examined 90 US bilateral markets in 1991
and found average US outgoing collection rates …crO†
were approximately half the incoming collection rate
…crI†. The Commission also suggested that the disparity
in collection rates was due to greater price competition
arising from US liberalization.5
Conversely, Cheong and Mullins (1991) argued that US
tra c de® cits were caused by di erences in country
incomes. They estimated an econometric model with tra c
imbalances expressed as a function of relative income (dif-
ference between US and foreign incomes) and relative
prices (di erence between US and foreign collection
rates). These results show US tra c de® cits are positively
related to relative income and not related to relative prices.
Cheong and Mullins argued that international tra c is
insensitive to collection rates since most of this tra c is
business related.6 Given the model’s low explanatory
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Fig. 1. IMTS and collection rates
Note: IMTS imbalance is the log of minutes of outgoing tra c
less the log of minutes of incoming tra c. Collection rate
di erential is the log of the (per-minute) outgoing collection
rate less the log of the (per-minute) incoming collection rate.
Sample consists of 82 bilateral markets for the period 1991
through 1995 (see Appendix for description of bilateral markets).
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Fig. 2. IMTS and income
Note: IMTS imbalance is the log of minutes of outgoing tra c
less the log of minutes of incoming tra c. Income di erential is
the log of GDP per capita for the outgoing country less the log of
GDP per capita for the incoming country. Sample consists of 82
bilateral markets for the period 1991 through 1995 (see Appendix
for description of bilateral markets).
5 A declining block rate structure also gives US callers an incentive to call for longer durations as the average per-minute call change
declines with length.
6 See Bewley and Fiebig (1988), and Taylor (1994).
power, Cheong and Mullins concluded that the growing
US de® cit may be due to socioeconomic and cultural dif-
ferences not captured in the model.
Acton and Vogelsang (1992) employed point-to-point
demand models to examine call reversion between the US
and 17 Western European countries for the period 1979
through 1986. Point-to-point models allow calls in one
direction to a ect return calls through reversion and reci-
procity (Larson et al., 1990) . Reversion suggests outgoing
call tra c …QO† and incoming call tra c …QI† volumes are
substitutes, or dQO=dQI < 0, which implies dQO=dcrI > 0.
Reciprocity suggests outgoing and incoming calls are
complimentary, that is, dQO=dQI > 0 and dQO=dcrI < 0.
Model estimates indicated no cross-price e ect
…dQO=dcrI ˆ 0†, that is, neither reversion nor reciprocity
motivations are apparent in aggregate tra c ¯ ows. Acton
and Vogelsang noted that because of transaction costs, call
reversion will occur only when the outgoing and incoming
collection rate di erential is large. Once this threshold is
reached, consumers in high price countries will reoriginate
calls from low price countries.7
Sandback (1996) accounted for reversion and transac-
tion costs by estimating a point-to-point model for out-
going tra c which included the price arguments,
outgoing collection rates, relative collection rates, and a
collection rate di erential which took e ect when the dif-
ference between foreign and domestic country collection
rates exceeds a transaction cost threshold. Using data
from 154 OECD bilateral telephone markets, Sandback
found relative collection rates and the collection rate di er-
ential terms have the impacts expected on outgoing tra c
but this a ect is not signi® cant. Sandback suggested that
there is some evidence to support the callback e ect where
arbitrage opportunities exceed a threshold of US$0.90 a
minute.
A separate body of game-theoretic work considers the
strategic interaction between carriers in setting collection
and accounting rates, and in turn, examine the impact of
these rates on telephone demand imbalances. Hakim and
Lu (1993, 1994) developed a model of bilateral monopoly
service provision. By modelling the strategic interaction
between carriers they examined how price setting and tech-
nological disparities a ect demand imbalances. Following
Larson et al. (1990) and Acton and Vogelsang (1992), they
accounted for reversion and reciprocity. They found, when
allowing for a negotiable settlement rate share, techno-
logical improvement by a domestic monopolist led to
reduced collection rates, increased demand for outgoing
calls, and a growing tra c imbalance.8 A tra c de® cit
entices the home country to revise the settlement rate
down in order to minimize the settlement out-payment.
This result is consistent with the behaviour of high income
countries whom, with stronger international call demand
and more advanced technology, seek lower settlement
rates.
Yun et al. (1997) extended this analysis and allowed
competition at either end of the bilateral market. They
found increased domestic competition lowered the out-
going collection rate, and exacerbated tra c imbalance.
Increased competition in the foreign country mitigates
bilateral tra c imbalance. This result supports the ® ndings
of Ergas and Patterson (1991) and the FCC (1992).
However, Yun et al. (1997) noted as the number of com-
petitors approaches in® nity, a high accounting rate reduced
tra c imbalances. This suggests that asymmetric market
structure (and the accounting rate system) are not the
sole cause of tra c imbalances in countries with liberalized
telecommunications sectors. Imbalances may result from
longer term cultural and socioeconomic factors. This is
re¯ ected in studies of international telephone demand.
Lago (1970), Yatrakis (1972), Rea and Lage (1978),
Acton and Vogelsang (1992) , showed that national income
is a determinant of demand, whilst Rohlfs (1974) suggested
point-to-point models should include variables that
approximate the community of interest between the calling
parties (countries) considered. The larger is the community
of interest, the greater is telephone tra c.
III . ECONOMETR IC MOD EL A ND DA TA
The preceding section implies the following general form
equation for IMTS imbalance …TB† between the domestic
country D and foreign country F:
TB ˆ TB…PO;PI ;MSO;MSI ;Y O ;Y I ;ZO ;ZI† …1†
where PO is the collection rate for a call from D to F, PI is
the collection rate for a call from F to D, MSO is a vector
describing the market structure (in terms of competition
and ownership) of D ’ s international IMTS sector, MS I is
a vector describing the market structure of F’ s inter-
national IMTS sector, Y O is country D income, Y I is
country F income, ZO is a vector of country D factors
approximating the community of interest between D and
F, and ZI is country F community of interest factors.
1314 J. Alleman et al.
7 Sandback (1996) argues that moderate collection rate di erentials have little e ect since callback operators cannot recover their own
costs, and still provide a price discount to compensate customers for callback inconvenience an overcome customer inertia.
8 In practice, most bilateral markets are governed by the 50 : 50 settlement rate share rule. The rule requires all carriers to accept the same
accounting rate for a particular bilateral market, and that the accounting rate is divided equally (so that settlement rates are the same for
terminating incoming calls and originating outgoing calls). This arrangement removed the incentive for a single carrier in a competitive
market to accept less favourable conditions from the foreign monopolist as they will apply to all carriers (Cave, 1995).
Following Cheong and Mullins (1991) and Sandback
(1996) we assume that it is relativities between independent
variables which a ect TB. The econometric model for
IMTS trade imbalance on bilateral market i at time t, in
log-linear form, is:
log TBit ˆ ¬0 ‡¬1 log …PO=PI†it ‡¬2 log …MO=MI†it
‡¬3 log …Y O=Y I†it ‡¬4 log …ZO=ZI†it ‡"it …2†
for i ˆ 1 ; . . . ;n, and t ˆ 1 ; . . . ;T , where ¬0 is an intercept,
¬1 through ¬4 are elasticities, and "it is a white noise dis-
turbance term.
With pooled time-series, cross-sectional data some of the
variation in TB may be caused by di erences in factor
prices, service quality and technology between the coun-
tries forming the bilateral market. The inclusion of
dummy variables for each individual bilateral market
allows for di erent intercepts across the sample. Finally,
the model is augmented to account for reversion a ects as
described by Acton and Vogelsang (1992) and Sandback
(1996):
log TBit ˆ ­ 0i ‡ ­ 1 log …PO=PI†it ‡ ­ 2 log…P¤†it
‡ ­ 3 log …MO=MI†it ‡ ­ 4 log…Y O=Y I†it
‡ ­ 5 log …ZO=ZI†it ‡uit …3†
where ­ 0i is the intercept for the ith bilateral market, P
¤ is a
measure of call reversion which comes into a ect when the
di erence between incoming and outgoing collection rates
exceeds a transactions cost threshold, ­ 1 through ­ 5 are
elasticities, and uit is a white noise disturbance term.
Theory suggests ­ 2 < 0, ­ 3 > 0 and ­ 5 > 0, whilst the
signs for ­ 4 and ­ 6 remain an empirical question. The abil-
ity of carriers to set collection rates above cost depends on
market power. Market power is in turn related to market
structure, measured here by the number of facilities-based
carriers and market concentration. Competition is rela-
tively stronger in country D when the number of country
D carriers exceeds the number of F carriers, or alterna-
tively, when D market concentration is less than F market
concentration. Since relatively lower collection rates in
country D should stimulate outgoing tra c, a positive rela-
tionship is expected between …MSO=MSI†1 and TB when
the number of carriers is used to measure competition,
and a negative relationship is expected when market con-
centration is used as the competition proxy. Generally,
privately owned carriers have an incentive to operate
more e ciently than public carriers (Hensher, 1986) . An
increase in the private ownership share of the dominant
country D carrier relative to F may result in lower outgoing
collection rates and an increase in outgoing tra c relative
to incoming tra c. A positive relationship is expected
between …MSO=MS I†2 and TB. Finally, community of
interest …ZO=ZI† is measured by the ratio of country D
and F trade shares.9 There is no a priori assumptions
about the sign for ­ 6 .
Equation 3 is estimated on annual data for 82 inter-
national bilateral telephone markets for the period 1991
through 1995 (see Appendix for a description of bilateral
markets) . Bilateral telephone markets are formed from 43
countries with average GDP per capita for the period 1991
through 1995 ranging from US$394 (India) to US$26914
(Switzerland). By de® ning low income countries as econo-
mies with average GDP per capita of US$2895 or less, and
high incomes countries as economies with GDP per capita
of US$2896 or more, it is possible to construct two
mutually exclusive subsamples.10 Of the 82 bilateral mar-
kets contained in the sample, 66 involve tra c ¯ ows
between high income country pairs and 16 involve tra c
between low and high income countries. A description of
the variables used for econometric estimation is provided in
Table 1.
4 . ECON OMETR IC R ESU LTS
Equation 3 is estimated by generalized least squares to
correct for within group autocorrelation and groupwise
heteroscedasticity. 11 Estimates are reported in Table 2 for
the full sample of 82 bilateral markets. Table 3 includes
estimates for the subsample of 66 markets containing
high income country pairs, and estimates for the subsample
of 16 markets comprising of high and low income country
pairs. Alternative facilities-based competition proxies are
used in all models: (i) denotes number of carriers; and
(ii) market concentration.
Full sample estimates accord with a priori expectations.
The estimated coe cient for the collection rate di erential
Trade imbalance in telephone services 1315
9 Other community of interest measures include immigrant population, common language, market size, tourism and trade (Taylor, 1994;
Sandback, 1996). Because these variables are measured in absolute terms it is di cult to isolate their individual impacts in the bidirec-
tional tra c model (3).
10 Our de® nition is based on standard ITU and World Bank classi® cations. The ITU (1997c) classify economies into the following
groups: low income, economies with GDP per capita of US$725 or less; lower-middle income, economies with GDP per capita of more
than US$726 and less than US$2895: upper-middle income, economies with GDP per capita of more than US$2896 and less than
US$8995: and high income, economies with GDP per capita of US$8956 or more.
11 Diagnostic testing of ordinary least squares residuals suggests the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. A Hausman test
indicates the use of individual intercept terms to capture di erences at the bilateral market level is consistent with these data. Estimates of
individual intercept terms for all models are available on request from the authors.
is consistent with the hypothesis that a reduction (increase)
in country D outgoing (incoming) collection rates stimu-
lates outgoing (incoming) calls which are in turn substi-
tuted for incoming (outgoing) calls. Similarly, the
signi® cant positive sign for call reversion suggests a collec-
tion rate di erential above a transaction cost threshold of
US$0.20 is su cient to promote further substitution
between outgoing and incoming calls.12 Both coe cients
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Table 1. Variable description
TB IMTS trade imbalance. Minutes of outgoing IMTS from D to F divided by minutes of incoming IMTS from F to D.
…PO=PI† Collection rate di erential. Peak rate collection rate (US$) per minute for a call from country D to F divided by the peak
rate collection rate (US$) per minute for a call from F to D.
…P¤† Call reversion. A variable that equals …PI=PO† when …PI=PO† is greater than 0.2; and zero otherwise. Where …PI=PO† is
the peak rate collection rate (US$) per minute for a call from country F to D divided by the peak rate collection rate
(US$) per minute for a call from D to F, less US$0.2.
…MSO=MSI†1 Asymmetric market structure ± facilities based carriers. The number of country D facilities-based carriers supplying
IMTS divided by the number of country F facilities-based carriers supplying IMTS.
Asymmetric market structure ± market concentration. The country D dominant facilities-based carrier’s share of IMTS
from D to F divided by the country F dominant facilities-based carrier’s share of IMTS from F to D.a
…MSO=MSI†2 Asymmetric market structure ± private ownership share. One plus the private ownership share of the dominant country D
facilities-based carrier, divided by one plus the private ownership share of the dominant country F facilities-based
carrier.
…Y O=Y I† Income di erential. Country D GDP (constant 1987 US$) per capita divided by country F GDP (constant 1987 US$)
per capita.
…ZO=ZI† Community of interest. The share of country D world trade with F divided by the share of country F world trade with D.
Source: FCC (1992), Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) (1997) , ITU (1996), IMF (1997) , TeleGeography Inc.
(1997) , World Bank (1997).
Note: a When carrier speci® c tra c data are unavailable for particular markets, the dominant carrier’s share of world outgoing tra c is
used as a proxy for bilateral market share.
Table 2. Full sample estimates
Dependent variable: (i) (ii)
IMTS trade inbalance logTB (n ˆ 82) (n ˆ 82)
Collection rate di erential log …PO=PI† 70.031a 70.028a
(73.132) (72.675)
Call reversion log …P¤† 0.005b 0.001
(1.972) (0.430)
Asymmetric market structure log …MSO=MSI†1 0.075a Ð
Facilities-based carriers (4.245)
Market concentration Ð 70.500a
(711.26)
Asymmetric market structure log …MSO=MSI†2 0.325a 0.390a
Private ownership share (15.86) (8.424)
Income di erential log …Y O=YI† 0.099a 0.062
(3.534) (1.757)
Community of interest log …ZO=ZI† 0.042 0.016
Trade (1.297) (0.473)
nT 410 410
Buse R2 0.99 0.99
F-test 10.78a 13.18a
Note: a Denotes signi® cance at the 1% level; b denotes signi® cance at the 5% level; t-ratio in parentheses; F-test
tests that the coe cients on the …n¡ 1† individual bilateral market dummy variables are equal to zero.
12 All models were estimated with call reversion variable constructed from transaction cost thresholds of US$0.10, US$0.20, US$0.30,
and US$0.40, respectively. Only the threshold of US$0.20 proved signi® cant.
for the asymmetric market structure variables are signi® -
cant and have the expected signs. The reported positive
coe cient for facilities-based carriers …MSO=MSI†1 indi-
cates that the entry of new carriers in a de® cit (surplus)
nation will increase (decrease) their tra c de® cit (surplus).
That is, as the number of country D carriers providing
outgoing call services increases relative to F, collection
rate di erentials are reduced, and outgoing tra c increases
relative to incoming tra c. Similarly, the positive coe -
cient on private ownership share …MSO=MSI†2 indicates
that domestic carrier conduct responds to the type of own-
ership. For instance, an increase in private ownership of
the dominant carrier in a de® cit nation may lead to e -
ciency gains which are passed on to consumers through
lower collection rates, which in turn, leads to increased
outgoing tra c. Model estimates also show that outgoing
(relative to incoming) tra c is higher the greater is the
outgoing country’s GDP per capita relative to its bilateral
market country partner. The result from model (ii), using
market concentration as the competition proxy, are quali-
tatively similar to those of (a). The coe cient estimate for
collection rate di erentials are negative, however, the
reversion variable has no impact. The expected coe cient
sign on market concentration is negative and suggests that
increased competition in D relative to F (as re¯ ected in
declining market share for the dominant carrier) enhances
collection rate di erentials and increases outgoing tra c
relative to incoming tra c.
Estimated coe cients for both the collection rate and
income di erentials are insigni® cant for the subsample of
high income country pairs. However, price a ects remain
in¯ uential through both call reversion and the asymmetric
market structure variables. Coe cients for facilities-based
carriers, market concentration, and private ownership
share are correctly signed and statistically signi® cant.
Collection rate di erentials and call reversion are not
signi® cant in the subsample of low and high income coun-
try pairs. In (i) market structure a ects on IMTS imbalance
are not evident through facilities-based competition but
remain strong in private ownership share. In (ii), market
structure a ects IMTS imbalance through market concen-
tration and private ownership. The coe cients on private
ownership share are signi® cant and relatively stable across
all models. This is not surprising since private ownership
may be proxying for potential competition, given that tele-
communications reforms usually include privatisation as a
precursor to the introduction of competition. Any increase
in the level of private ownership at either end of the market
may provide a signal to domestic and foreign carriers that
increased competition for market share may be forthcom-
ing. Finally, the estimated coe cient for income is large
and signi® cant in (i) and (ii) and suggests that income
Trade imbalance in telephone services 1317
Table 3. Subsample estimates
(i) (ii) (i) (ii)
High High High and High and
income income low income low income
country country country country
Dependent variable: pairs pairs pairs pairs
IMTS trade imbalance logTB (n ˆ 66) (n ˆ 66) (n ˆ 16) (n ˆ 16)
Collection rate di erential log …PO=PI† 70.001 70.023a 70.068 70.007
(70.117) (72.517) (71.309) (70.169)
Call reversion log …P¤† 0.004 0.001 0.015 0.014
(1.511) (0.585) (1.131) (1.007)
Asymmetric market structure log …MSO=MSI†1 0.039b Ð 70.090 Ð
Facilities-based carriers (1.972) (70.947)
Market concentration Ð 70.429a Ð 70.762a
(710.41) (76.416)
Asymmetric market structure log …MSO=MSI†2 0.314a 0.432a 0.250a 0.240a
Private ownership share (15.62) (8.922) (2.794) (2.530)
Income di erential log …Y O=Y I† 70.036 70.058 0.824a 0.712a
(71.068) (71.804) (6.360) (6.289)
Community of interest log …ZO=ZI† 0.068 0.057 70.033 70.029
Trade (1.705) (1.659) (70.589) (70.495)
nT 330 330 80 80
Buse R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
F-test 12.80a 15.31a 7.800a 9.720a
Note: a Denotes signi® cance at the 1% level; b denotes signi® cance at the 5% level; t-ratio in parentheses; F-test tests that the coe cients
on the …n¡ 1† individual bilateral market dummy variables are equal to zero.
di erences are the dominant source of tra c imbalance in
markets comprising of low and high income country part-
ners. Consider a low income country which has a tra c
surplus with a high income country. A per cent increase in
this country’s GDP per capita would stimulate outgoing
tra c and result in a 0.824 (0.712) per cent reduction in
the high income country’s tra c de® cit. High income coun-
tries are likely to have a more extensive level of network
development and a greater propensity for new investment
which leads to cost e ciencies. Thus, lower collection rates
would be generally expected in high income countries.
5 . CONCLUSI ONS
The accounting rate system and concentrated telecommu-
nications markets have contributed to the distortion in
IMTS settlement payments. Pressure is building within
the telecommunications community to revise the current
system of settlement payments, and to promote greater
competition between carriers (FCC, 1997b, 1996 ; ITU,
1997b; WTO, 1997) . This pressure has come mainly from
carriers and government agencies in those countries which
make substantial settlement payments to countries that are
net-exporters of IMTS.
This study develops an econometric model to empirically
identify determinants of IMTS imbalance. Model results
show that collection rate di erentials and asymmetric
market structure are important determinants of imbalance
in bilateral markets comprising of high income country
partners. Therefore, FCC (1996, 1997b) and WTO (1997)
initiatives to achieve e cient pricing through reforms to
market structure should be most e ective in stimulating
tra c from high income countries, traditionally served by
publicly owned monopolies. GDP per capita appears to be
the dominant source of tra c imbalance in markets com-
prising of low and high income country partners.
Economic development policies that enhance income per
capita and telecommunications network investment may
be more appropriate mechanisms for stimulating outgoing
tra c from developing countries. Here, market orientated
liberalization policies should be accompanied by develop-
ment programmes such as those advocated by the EBRD
(1995) and World Bank.
Finally, tra c imbalance between country partners only
concerns economists because of ine cient pricing. When
collection rates and settlement rates re¯ ect the cost of ser-
vice provision, the issue of imbalance issue becomes less
relevant. In this ® rst-best world, economic rents would be
dissipated and relative prices would provide correct signals
to IMTS users. In a second-best world, the choice of
mechanisms for achieving an e cient and equitable out-
come for developing countries is clearly important. One
such mechanism would require a careful blend of increased
market liberalization in high income countries, along with
targeted assistance programmes in developing countries. In
the words of Gautam Kaji (1996, p. 5):
We (the World Bank Group) see considerable scope for
the protection of developing country interests in the
competition among the developed countries to supply
their markets. As a critical mass of developed countries
liberalizes their own markets, developing countries will
bene® t from competition among telecommunications
suppliers and the threat of unfair use of market power
will be minimized.
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A PPEND IX
IMTS tra c
million minutes Income
Bilateral market GDP per capitaa
De® cit
Country (1) Country (2) (1) (2) (surplus) (1) (2) High/Lowb
Australia UK 131.26 102.22 29.04 13 690 12 879 HH
Australia New Zealand 108.10 109.61 (1.51) 13 690 11 430 HH
Belgium France 234.37 202.74 31.63 16 125 17 663 HH
Belgium UK 87.00 88.50 (1.50) 16 125 12 879 HH
Belgium Italy 50.86 47.17 3.69 16 125 14 944 HH
Canada UK 126.39 99.22 27.17 15 660 12 879 HH
Canada France 43.79 32.80 10.99 15 660 17 663 HH
Chile US 27.31 47.94 (20.63) 2286 19 940 LH
Denmark Germany 87.09 88.25 (1.16) 21 289 20 282 HH
Denmark Sweden 78.48 88.08 (9.60) 21 289 19 233 HH
Denmark UK 49.31 47.14 2.17 21 289 12 879 HH
Denmark Norway 47.43 51.64 (4.21) 21 289 23 771 HH
France Italy 220.10 215.32 4.78 17 663 14 944 HH
France Spain 159.60 145.47 14.13 17 663 8876 HH
France Portugal 118.68 49.86 68.82 17 663 5087 HH
France Netherlands 84.98 94.39 (9.41) 17 663 16 856 HH
Morocco France 54.09 70.12 (16.03) 912 17 663 LH
Germany Austria 362.16 324.27 37.90 20 282 17 645 HH
Germany UK 326.14 311.28 14.86 20 282 12 879 HH
Germany France 347.04 292.26 54.78 20 282 17 663 HH
Germany Italy 320.81 248.19 72.62 20 282 14 944 HH
Germany Turkey 322.66 96.10 226.56 20 282 1806 HL
Germany Poland 169.01 92.48 76.54 20 282 1553 HL
Germany Spain 138.93 127.34 11.60 20 282 8876 HH
Germany Belgium 128.91 125.43 3.48 20 282 16 125 HH
Germany Greece 103.92 69.00 34.93 20 282 4954 HH
Germany Sweden 63.63 74.59 (10.96) 20 282 16 304 HH
Germany Russia 40.80 27.79 13.02 20 282 2407 HL
Germany Portugal 49.37 25.43 23.94 20 282 5087 HH
Germany Hungary 51.53 49.42 2.10 20 282 2273 HL
Greece UK 47.33 48.28 (0.95) 4954 12 879 HH
Greece Italy 31.32 27.89 3.43 4954 14 944 HH
Hong Kong Chinese-Taipei 76.59 67.11 9.48 11 199 9225 HH
Hong Kong Japan 55.37 49.73 5.65 11 199 23 935 HH
Hong Kong UK 55.36 44.78 10.58 11 199 12 879 HH
Hong Kong Australia 40.27 32.86 7.41 11 199 13 690 HH
Hong Kong Singapore 41.92 43.80 (1.88) 11 199 11 748 HH
India Saudi Arabia 49.14 29.49 19.65 394 13 690 LH
Indonesia Singapore 36.22 42.20 (5.98) 643 11 748 LH
Italy Spain 57.54 59.55 (2.01) 14 944 8876 HH
Italy Austria 41.62 39.99 1.63 14 944 17 645 HH
Italy Netherlands 35.06 39.78 (4.72) 14 944 16 856 HH
Japan South Korea 144.46 93.69 50.76 23 935 4981 HH
Japan Thailand 61.92 26.46 35.46 23 935 1601 HL
Netherlands Germany 287.31 284.31 3.00 16 856 20 282 HH
Netherlands Belgium 205.49 200.61 4.88 16 856 16 125 HH
Netherlands UK 156.68 136.42 20.26 16 856 12 879 HH
Norway Sweden 99.02 104.37 (5.35) 23 771 19 233 HH
Norway UK 50.13 41.18 8.95 23 771 12 879 HH
Portugal Spain 35.66 34.44 1.22 5087 8876 HH
Singapore Malaysia 147.80 119.55 28.25 11 748 2751 HL
Spain US 59.89 108.30 (48.41) 8876 19 940 HH
Sweden Finland 106.80 94.60 12.20 19 233 17 735 HH
Sweden UK 64.80 54.18 10.62 19 233 12 879 HH
Sweden US 55.94 65.12 (9.18) 19 233 19 940 HH
Switzerland Germany 368.25 339.91 28.34 26 914 20 282 HH
Switzerland France 261.75 144.34 117.41 26 914 17 663 HH
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IMTS tra c
million minutes Income
Bilateral market GDP per capitaa
De® cit
Country (1) Country (2) (1) (2) (surplus) (1) (2) High/Lowb
Switzerland Italy 231.14 156.12 75.03 26 914 14 944 HH
Switzerland UK 88.44 86.88 1.56 26 914 12 879 HH
Switzerland US 70.12 105.84 (35.72) 26 914 19 940 HH
Chinese-Taipei Japan 58.62 81.76 (23.14) 9225 23 935 HH
UAE India 67.58 28.89 38.69 14 944 394 HL
UK France 290.36 287.84 2.52 12 879 17 663 HH
UK Ireland 288.10 215.69 72.41 12 879 11 773 HH
UK Italy 140.60 127.39 13.21 12 879 14 944 HH
UK Spain 128.44 127.55 0.89 12 879 8876 HH
US Canada 2499.23 1691.40 807.83 19 940 15 660 HH
US Mexico 1458.53 661.90 796.63 19 940 1845 HL
US UK 824.53 549.98 274.54 19 940 12 879 HH
US Germany 592.27 355.71 236.56 19 940 20 282 HH
US Japan 428.80 289.38 139.42 19 940 23 935 HH
US France 275.18 153.94 121.24 19 940 17 663 HH
US Philippines 233.57 54.77 178.80 19 940 612 HL
US Italy 229.22 136.38 92.84 19 940 14 944 HH
US Chinese-Taipei 194.42 92.25 102.17 19 940 9225 HH
US Brazil 187.82 63.63 124.19 19 940 1963 HL
US Hong Kong 176.08 89.04 87.04 19 940 11 199 HH
US Israel 168.10 54.69 113.41 19 940 9775 HH
US India 156.44 53.44 102.99 19 940 394 HL
US Australia 139.27 120.78 18.49 19 940 13 690 HH
US Netherlands 114.27 76.37 37.90 19 940 16 856 HH
Venezuela US 52.25 87.20 (34.95) 2735 19 940 LH
Note: a denotes average real GDP per capita (US$) 1991± 95; b H denotes high income country, L denotes low income country.
Source. CEPD (1997) , ITU (1996), TeleGeography Inc. (1997), World Bank (1997) .
